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Strategies for Workforce Flexibility and Capability: 
The New Job Families at Boeing St. Louis 
 
Executive Summary 
 
The IDS (Integrated Defense Systems) Boeing St. Louis plant is at the frontier of fostering 
workforce flexibility and new investment in skills. Pioneering systems for just-in-time 
delivery of training combine with high performance work systems, front-line quality 
inspection, and labor-management cooperation.  This experience points the way toward a 
model of skill development that meets employer needs for continuous adaptation and 
employee interest in lifelong learning.  At the core of this case are the joint efforts by the 
company and the union that have enabled the progress to date.     
 
In 2001, Boeing St Louis and the IAM (International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers) sought to promote flexibility and increase competitiveness by 
grouping the existing 51 job classifications into 9 new job families or labor grades. 
Importantly, workers retained their seniority rights within the previous classifications, 
which continue to govern layoff/recall, overtime, vacation, and shift issues. However, the 
contract now allows for them to perform tasks in other classifications within the same or a 
lower labor grade. The heart of this case study centers on understanding how this agreement 
has been implemented, the degree to which the compressed classifications have resulted in 
improved outcomes for the employer and employees, and the policy implications of the 
effort.   
 
Under a 1996 labor-management agreement there was a substantial increase in training 
across the facility, a large proportion of which involved cross-training.  This heightened 
level of training has continued under a 2001 agreement.  Overall, the amount of training in 
this facility has more than doubled, with even greater increases in some work areas.  During 
this overall time period, there has been a substantial increase in quality and productivity 
outcomes.  In some cases, such as in the quality outcomes, the rate of improvement has 
leveled off, but this is still a notable accomplishment given the significant increase in front-
line operator verification of quality, the sale of a key part of the business associated with 
fabrication, layoffs and other factors.  There are administrative challenges in maintaining 
consistent progress on a wall-to-wall basis in the facility.  Still, the core model of increased 
flexibility, combined with just-in-time training and protection of core seniority rights is 
proving to be a far more sustainable model then the initial efforts at this location. 
 
The experience of the IAM and demonstrates that it is possible for labor and management 
to reach a strategic agreement, linking increased flexibility in operations with increased 
investment in people.  Realizing the full benefits of such an agreement is a complex 
challenge, involving fundamental shifts in the way front-line operations are run, as well as 
culture changes in support functions such as training, quality, finance, and production 
control.  The development of a just-in-time capability to deliver training and on-line skills 
coaching mechanisms has elevated training to a strategic status – as a key part of the way 
business objectives are met.  This is possible since training has been restructured to be 
integral to the lean model of manufacturing that places a higher value on continued flow in 
operations and front-line capability (particularly with respect to quality).  Equally important 
has been the High Performance Work Organization (HPWO) model advanced by the IAM, 
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which is a form of team-based operations that is consistent with the union’s concerns for 
fairness and attention to other workforce interests.   
 
There are important policy implications that derive from the IAM/ experience, including 
implications for apprenticeship policy and the U.S. Department of Labor’s O*Net, which is 
a newly updated Standard Occupation Classification system. On the one hand, the nine job 
families do not have a specified set of component tasks in ways that would match 
traditional apprenticeship models.   Instead, the case points toward a model of targeted skill 
acquisition where individual workers each accumulate different mixes of skills over time.  
Combined with a just-in-time delivery system, it is a model that is responsive to evolving 
skill requirements on the part of the employer while keeping training costs low. It is also a 
model that meets a desire for continually expanding capability on the part of employees. 
This, however, raises the issue of certification, in order to ensure portability of the acquired 
skills across firms.  At present, such portability is not a feature of this case, but a “skills 
passport” or other mechanism to document acquired skills would be an appropriate 
complement to the innovations observed in this case.  A broader policy challenge would 
involve the development of a general architecture of new skill standards that can be used in 
flexible delivery models such as the one featured in the  operations.   
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I. Introduction 
 
Over $210 billion is spent every year on workplace training in the U.S. alone, and yet, not 
enough is known about how the institutional arrangements for the delivery of training are 
evolving to ensure that these investments deliver value to the different stakeholders 
involved.1   This case examines the effect of a high profile shift in institutional training 
arrangements at .  Through collective bargaining, the parties agreed to a compression of job 
classifications into job families in order to foster organizational flexibility and multi-
skilling. This push for flexibility and investment in skills is linked to the implementation of 
lean production practices and related operational innovations to render the facility more 
competitive.  Our aim is to assess the short and long-term impact of these strategic changes. 
 
Motivating this research are current efforts of the U.S. Department of Labor (DoL) in the 
area of employment and training, including the recent revision and transformation of the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles 
(DOT)into what is now termed O*NET 
(Occupational Information Network).  The 
revision replaced thousands of little-used or 
obsolete jobs from the listing and instead 
offers a set of some 1,100 occupations, 
based on the 2000 Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) system used for all 
government data on occupations.  Each 
O*NET occupation has detailed 
information on required knowledge skills 
and abilities. The clustering of well 
established, apprenticeable job 
classifications into new, combined job 
families by Boeing  mirrors the change in 
detail effected by the transition from the 
DOT to O*NET classification.  Thus, DoL 
was interested to document the specific 
elements of this initiative to help guide 
future policy around employment and 
training, particularly with regard to 
business demand for skills.   
 
Historically, the mass production system featured dozens of job classifications that were 
written into U.S. contracts and incorporated into operations. Management drove this 
process, under the logic of Taylorism, where work was segmented into narrowly specified 
jobs in order to increase efficiency and consistency.2  These narrow classifications were 
initially resisted by unions as a threat to craft autonomy, but later embraced by the labor 
movement as a way to protect against the arbitrary rule of the front-line supervisor, as a 
                                                 
1
 See Anthony P. Carnevale, Leila J. Gainer and Janice Villet (1990).  Training in America:  The Organization 
and Strategic Role of Training, San  Francisco:  Jossey-Bass; and Galvin, T. (2001, March), “Training Top 50,” 
Training, pp. 57-79 for data on training investments. 
2 Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management  (New York: Harper Bros., 1911) 
A Brief Description of O*NET 
 
With the goal of providing a more accurate 
picture of the turn-of-the-century U.S. labor 
market, the Department of Labor replaced in 
1998 its 50 year-old Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles (DOT) with an electronic Occupational 
Information Network (O*NET).  
 
The new system is “driven by skills rather than 
tasks” with a focus on those skills that are 
attainable through conventional schooling and 
are thus transferable between jobs.  It contains 
far fewer entries than did the last revision of the 
DOT (1991), since many of the listed titles no 
longer exist as independent vocations.  Over 
12,700 job titles have been replaced with 
approximately 1,100 occupations.  Consequently, 
O*NET essentially bundled multiple, narrow 
jobs into single titles, while providing far more 
finely-grained detail on the skills and training 
required both to secure employment and to 
perform satisfactorily once employed. 
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way to link the attainment of higher seniority with increased choice over job assignments, 
and as a way to constrain management from unilaterally reducing the size of the workforce.  
Today, these narrow classifications can serve as a barrier to the cross-utilization of workers, 
reducing flexibility in operations and even constraining the employment options of the 
worker.  In a number of industries, there is a growing trend toward the negotiation of 
increased flexibility in collective bargaining agreements, as well as increased use of 
combined classifications in non-union settings.  For example, in a 1996 national random 
sample survey of union and management negotiators of collective bargaining agreements, 
approximately 30% reported new language on work rule flexibility, while a second national 
survey conducted three years later in 1999 found over 39% of agreements contained new 
language on work rule flexibility.3    
 
Not enough is known, however, about the impact of agreements to increase such flexibility 
– especially in the aerospace industry where work often involves high levels of skill and 
depth of craftsmanship.  In the case of Boeing St. Louis, union and management agreed in 
2001 to group the existing 51 job classifications into 9 new job families or labor grades.  
Workers would maintain their old classifications for purposes of layoff/recall, overtime 
distribution, vacation scheduling and shift bumps. However, they could now perform tasks 
in other classifications within the same or a lower labor grade. All employees would be 
expected, furthermore, to perform general duties such as moving parts, clean up, on-the-
job-training and cross training, and quality control.  The agreement also included job 
security language and complemented a joint union-management High Performance Work 
Organization (HPWO) team-based work system in place since 1996.  
 
 This agreement has the potential to serve as a model for others seeking to achieve 
efficiencies for the company together with enhanced skills and employability for the 
workforce.    
Management reports that increased ability to cross-utilize workers has led to gains in 
productivity, scheduling, and cost savings. Substantial investments in skills training have 
been provided, using a remarkable just-in-time training delivery system that targets the 
specific needs of each work area.  The individuals who have volunteered for cross training 
report that they enjoy the greater variety of tasks and the opportunity to learn new things.  
Many believe that having more skills can be helpful although virtually all those interviewed 
stressed that the labor market in St. Louis precludes greater external job opportunities.  At 
the same time, there is a measure of uneasiness expressed by some employees about having 
enough training to do the work in other classifications.  Also, there are fears that the new 
tasks will, in the end, eliminate jobs. An unexpected, complicating factor is a growing gap 
between those who take on new tasks, who tend to be younger, and those workers with 
more seniority who are not seeking as many training opportunities.   
 
From a theory perspective, this case is a great example of effective job redesign as 
described by Hackman and Oldham.4  As prescribed in this classic work, the new job 
family plan offers what the authors termed “skill variety” and provides greater “task 
identity.”  Building aircraft has always been high in “task significance,” while the HPWO 
process increases “autonomy,” and the variety of inspection options as well as performance 
                                                 
3 Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Thomas Kochan:  “Taking Stock:  Collective Bargaining at the Beginning of 
the 21st Century” (Working Paper Under Review, 2002). 
4 Hackman and Oldham, Job Redesign (1975). 
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metrics provide important “feedback.”  These are all classic elements recommended in job 
redesign. Moreover, there is no doubt that this workforce feels they make a meaningful 
contribution to the defense of the country. They take great responsibility for their efforts 
and are very conscious of the costs of any failure in an aircraft they produce.   
 
Hackman and Oldham predict that if these conditions are met, then the workers will be 
motivated and feel great job satisfaction.  One lesson from this research, however, is that 
workforce motivation is not only driven by internal job design features.  While there were 
certainly many workers who valued the investments in training and the work arrangements, 
there were also many with overriding concerns about job security.  These concerns were 
fueled by a lay off involving 260 employees that was announced shortly before our visit to 
the plant in June 2003.  An additional key part of the context for this case was Boeing’s 
competition for the role of prime contractor for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the newest U. 
S. military aircraft.  If Boeing had won this contract, which went to Lockheed Martin, the 
St. Louis facility  would have had a favorable long-term employment horizon, validating 
the risks that union and management leaders took in establishing the new, flexible 
arrangements and facilitating their implementation. While the innovations featured in this 
case may still leave the facility more competitive than it would have otherwise been, the 
loss of this business opportunity further heightened job security concerns.  These 
complicating circumstances may temper some of the enthusiasm in the workforce, but it is 
important to note that the continued operation of the job family system at , does suggest that 
the model is sustainable even in a cyclical context such as the aerospace industry.  
 
 
II. Research Design and Methods 
 
The team working on this study is from the MIT Labor Aerospace Research Agenda 
(LARA) and the research was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor (DoL).  LARA is 
an ongoing research project investigating the impact of instability and investments in 
intellectual capital for the aerospace workforce.5  The team has conducted over 50 
interviews during the course of two trips to the Boeing facility in St. Louis, Missouri.  On 
the first trip, we interviewed the plant manager, the IAM District Lodge 837 president, and 
14 other company executives across the functional areas of finance, quality, production 
operations, supply chain, labor relations, HPWO coordination, and training.  On the second 
visit, team members did 39 interviews with hourly workers, coaches/trainers, and union 
representatives.  These individuals worked on four teams in four separate departments, 
which were selected in consultation with the company to be representative of a range of 
stages in team development and a mix of products.   
 
Since the timing for training and the mix of pre-existing skills varies across the four 
departments, tracking these departments over time represents something of a “naturally 
occurring experiment.”  In addition to the individual interviews, 34 of those interviewed 
                                                 
5 The Labor Aerospace Research Agenda (LARA) is a research program at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology.  It is affiliated with the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI), a much larger consortium of industry, 
labor, government and academic scholars who are studying different aspects of the U.S. and global aerospace 
industries.  LAI and LARA are supported by funds from the MANTECH division of the U.S. Air Force. Both 
LARA and LAI are based in MIT’s Center for Technology, Productivity and Industrial Development. Other 
LARA work is available at <http://web.mit.edu/ctpid/lara/>. 
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completed a short survey to investigate their perceptions and attitudes. While the small 
sample size reduces the statistical power of these data, they offer a corroborating capture of 
the workers’ view of the process and complement the qualitative data obtained through 
interviews.  
 
The company also provided archival data on overall facility performance and quality 
metrics, health and safety, grievances, and training records, as well as results from 
company-wide employee surveys before and after the new job family system was 
implemented.  Archival data was also provided on the four departments, which we have 
labeled A, B, C, and D and which are involved in three of the major products built at this 
site.  One of the departments – Department A – featured a team that was on the brink of 
becoming level 4, the highest HPWO level.  A second, Department B, was at level 3 and 
the remaining two (Departments C and D) were at level 2. The hourly workers and shop 
stewards we interviewed came from these teams and/or represented their work area. 
Monthly training and performance data were provided for the four departments that closely 
correspond with the work teams6 starting in January 2001 as well as before, in the case of 
training records. These four vignettes will enable us to gain a more in-depth view of the 
dynamics of implementation and related outcomes.     
      
[See Appendix for copies of the hourly interview questions and the survey 
instrument] 
 
 
III. Setting the Stage 
 
Boeing’s St. Louis plant is headquarters of the company’s Integrated Defense Systems 
Division and employed 15,000 people in May 2001. At that time, 3,100 of these workers 
were members of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers 
(IAM) Lodge No. 837.  This is down from the plant’s peak employment of 12,000 union 
machinists in 1990. The plant assembles the following aircraft models: the F-18 Super 
Hornet, the F-15 Eagle, the C-17 Globemaster III, the T-45 Goshawk, and the AV-8B 
Harrier II. In addition to producing multiple products, there is variation within each 
product. As one senior manager at the facility noted, “no two planes are alike – this is not 
mass production.”  The plant also houses a “phantom works” site that carries out R&D on 
advanced space and communications, military aircraft, and missiles. The facility is located 
directly adjacent to the Lambert Field Airport and one can often see fighter planes and hear 
the roar of their jet engines during the time one spends there. 
 
The work at this location demands high levels of skills and capabilities.  These workers are 
well trained and proud of the work that they do.  Many come into the job with A & P 
certifications (Airframe and Power Plant Mechanic)7 and/or intensive military experience 
                                                 
6 The correspondence between teams and departments is exact in one of the teams. Two other teams are in 
departments that also include workers in second or third-shift teams. The fourth team includes people in two 
departments on the same shift. We have used the department as the unit of analysis because most of the 
performance metrics we are interested in are available at the department rather than the team level.  These 
data correspond to all individuals interviewed and some that were not. 
7  For in-depth information on the A&P certification see the U.S. Department of Labor site at  http://umet-
vets.dol.gov/airframe-mechanic.htm . 
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and training.  Workers report that their military training occurred on planes similar to the 
ones they build on the job.  For example, one worker told us about his four years in the 
Navy where he worked as a structural mechanic, in sheet metal and on hydraulics. So they 
come to the job with years of hands-on experience and a thorough understanding of product 
performance, maintenance issues, and operational factors.  Older workers may have 
received extensive in-house initial training in their core skills.  It is unclear whether this 
was through apprenticeship training since it has been more than two decades since formal 
apprenticeships have been utilized in this facility.  On average, workers at the facility have 
a minimum of 15 to 18 years of experience in their jobs.   
 
 
IV.  The Job Family Agreement 
 
The change in job classifications at Boeing St. Louis is the result of labor-management 
negotiations.  While initial job classification changes and the introduction of a high 
performance work organization occurred in 1996, the contract that went into effect in 2001 
contained the most comprehensive classification compressions.  An interesting precedent of 
the new job families was the Assembly Mechanic—All Around classification created in 
1996. The “All-Arounds” were to master the skills of all four main assembly 
classifications: Sheet Metal Assembler and Riveter (SMAR), Mechanic—Aircraft 
Production (MAP), Mechanic—Electrical and Radio (MER), and Sub-Assembler—
Precision (SAP). Volunteers from these classifications were selected for extensive cross 
training and paid an extra 75 cents/hour; 25 cents for each of the three additional skill sets 
they were now to perform. The program, however, ran into two types of obstacles:  For one 
thing, the training took too long and created manpower redistribution issues.  Only 100 of 
the originally proposed 600 “All Arounds” were certified. The union disliked the program 
and set restrictions upon it.  In particular, one contract rule instructed that for every 20 
workers being laid off in the four feeder classifications, there would be one “AllAround” 
laid off.  This proved fatal to the initiative. Because this was a less populated classification, 
people with high seniority who had volunteered for the new position began to be laid off 
and many requested transfer back to their old classifications, bringing the program to an 
end. Management learned from this earlier attempt at increasing job flexibility that training 
would need to be more targeted and workers reassured that their seniority would be 
maintained.  The site manager, who negotiated the 2001 contract, emphasized this latter 
aspect when explaining the new job family concept: “People still have their classification, 
their heritage, and seniority.”  
 
The 2001 agreement grouped an overall total of 51 existing job classifications into 9 job 
families or labor grades.  Workers kept their old classifications for purposes of layoff/recall, 
overtime distribution, vacation scheduling and shift bumps.  However, they could now 
perform tasks in other classifications within the same or a lower labor grade. All employees 
would be expected, furthermore, to perform general duties such as moving parts, clean up, 
on-the-job-training and cross training, and quality control. Part of the rationale for the new 
work rules was the reduction of unnecessary down time while workers waited for members 
of another craft to come to do a task that was not part of their skill base. An important 
concurrent development was the introduction of lean practices such as operator verification 
for quality and point-of-use logistics for just-in-time material delivery. The contract also 
made clear that all related training decisions would reside with management. 
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Table 1: Job Families with Associated Classifications 
 
Job Family/Labor Grade 
 (From highest to lowest) 
Classifications 
Tooling Inspector—Metrology 
Inspector--Tool & Die 
Tool & Die Maker Machinist--All Around  
Builder Mock-Up & Tooling  
Machinist—General 
Welder--Tooling  
Heat Treater—Tool Room 
Flight Inspector—Aircraft 
Mechanic--Electrical & Electronics 
Mechanic—Flight  
Mechanic—Electro-Optic 
Maintenance a Mechanic—Machine Repair  
Maintenance Mechanic--All Around  
Pipefitter--Maintenance  
Mechanic--Automotive  
Painter—Maintenance 
Assembly Inspector—Assembly 
Subassembler--Precision  
Mechanic--Aircraft Production 
Mechanic--Electrical & Radio 
Sheet Metal Assembler & Riveter 
Process Sheet Metal Fabricator  
Painter--Sign  
Mechanic--Tube & Cable  
Painter--Spray 
Plater--Precision  
Operator--Chemical Processor  
Operator--Nameplate Processing  
Machine & Hand Sewer 
Support Production Material Coordinator  
Crater & Packer 
Material Handler—Specialist 
Utility Worker—Utility 
Munitions Mechanic—Munitions 
Maintenance b Garage Attendant  
Housekeeper  
Maintenance Worker 
Source: Adapted from Articles of Agreement between the Boeing Company and District Lodge No. 837, IAM  
Note:  Additional classifications in the contract, but not populated include:  Grinder--Precision Tool & Cutter, 
Heat Treater—Dural, Maintenance Worker--Furniture Mover, Maintenance Worker—Laborer, Maintenance 
Worker--Machine & Equipment Operator Maintenance Worker--Sweeper—Janitor, Operator--Hydraulic 
Press & Hammer, Parts Finisher--Machine Shop, Sand Blaster, Template Maker 
 
At the core of the 2001 contract is a linkage between employment security and flexibility.  
At the time  was trying to win the government award for the Joint Strike Fighter.  This was 
in the back of everyone’s mind. The company saw job flexibility as essential in order to 
rationalize production and become more competitive for this and other future bids.8  The 
union insisted that the workers’ concern over stability would also need to be addressed. 
                                                 
8 In fact, Lockheed Martin, which won the JSF contract, also emphasized flexible work arrangements in its 
manufacturing operations. 
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Both parties agreed to include job security language, guaranteeing no lay offs during the 
life of the contract unless there was diminishing product demand.  
 
 
V.  A Strategic Training Plan 
 
Management learned from the 1996 experience that changing job classifications required 
careful consideration of the training needs for employees who made the switch.  Such 
tactical considerations drove another strategy for implementing the 2001 agreement. This 
time there was a more integrated set of activities that involved shop supervisors.  Training 
was reevaluated and a new training delivery process developed.  Training would be “pull-
based” – targeted according to need rather than given to all workers regardless of whether 
they might use it. This delivery scheme provides short-term savings and quick turn around.  
As one Production Manager commented, “We couldn’t train everyone in everything at 
once, so each area had to set its priorities.” 
 
In order to determine the facilities’ training needs, shop supervisors were asked to analyze 
their areas using the following criteria: 
• Flexibility and continuous flow of planned work 
• Reducing delays and set-up time caused by the movement of employees from one 
job assignment to another 
• Enabling employees to complete entire zones of the aircraft vs. smaller jobs or tasks 
• Enhancing employee skills and developing new ones 
• Promoting accountability and first time quality 
• Promoting standardized work.9 
 
After they finished the work environment assessment, the shop supervisors were asked to 
“review current employee job assignments, evaluate individual employee skills, determine 
new employee skills needed, and then create a cross-training matrix.”10  In most cases, the 
training matrix for each department is still maintained by the supervisor.  In the case of 
some more advanced teams (these are at what is termed Level 4), it is the team that 
maintains the matrix. 
 
The process of needs assessment is ongoing.  As the Manager of Training commented, 
“Supervisors sometimes are happy and sometimes they request modifications in the 
training.  These are vocal, active, engaged customers.”  He also noted that the trainers often 
discover additional training needs while they are delivering a particular skill. 
 
Not all supervisors initially embraced the system of just-in-time training with equal 
enthusiasm.  At the outset, one member of the training department commented, “we could 
judge the commitment of the supervisor by the quality of the people they were sending for 
training.”  This reflects a key underlying cultural challenge with respect to training across 
classifications.  Even with the smaller modules and just-in-time delivery model, there was 
still the need to shift the mindsets of supervisors away from seeing the training as time off 
the job that interferes with operations and toward being an essential investment in building 
                                                 
9 From materials provided by the facility 
10 From materials provided by the facility 
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capability.  This same individual commented that many workers, too, were skeptical that 
their new skills wouldn’t be used or that they would end up taking away someone’s job.  He 
concluded, however, by noting that “After three years, we are still doing this.  People are 
beginning to believe that it is not just a fad.”  
 
One Production Manager noted that this system involves “holding meetings every Monday 
to calibrate.  We want to avoid having people completely shift jobs and we want to target 
the training in places where value will be added.  The union is asked a lot about the training 
plans.  We did not promise to train everyone in everything and our training budgets 
certainly did not increase.  We are averaging around 37 hours per person per year.”  He 
went on to note that the hardest part of the change has been the shift in mindsets.  “Some 
people on the floor couldn’t wait for this, while others were resistant.  Most difficult has 
been allowing people to make mistakes as they learn.  We have to build this into the way 
we plan.” 
 
Cross training is the critical type of training for this study, but is only one of several types 
of training that employees receive. Workers have a regimen of common training in areas 
such as health and safety, operator verification, or team skills that appear to be mandated 
for everyone. Additionally, there is training that is required by the government procurement 
contract for certain programs.   For example, the flight ramp workers are required to have 
re-certification training for a variety of program-related skills such as pyrotechnics and 
ejector seat maintenance.   
 
Another component of the in-house training opportunities is the Advanced Craftsmanship 
Learning Center (ACLC), which was established in 1997.  The ACLC is a training center 
that helps people learn to perform tasks related to a specific program or product.  The 
centers are staffed by full and part-time coaches drawn from the workforce who generally 
do their work one-on-one with individual workers.  The driving force behind the 
development of the ACLC is the reduction and prevention of defects.  The coaches are 
selected for their skill and expertise but must also have some interpersonal skills and 
develop credibility among their peers to be successful.  As the Manager of Training 
commented, “The Facility Manager said to the supervisors, ‘Give me your best and your 
brightest.’  We didn’t want just anyone who was available.”  The ACLC uses defects data 
and information from inspectors to identify employees in need of training. It also assists 
with the on-the-job training phase that follows cross-training courses.  
 
There is formal contract language on apprenticeships, but it has not been utilized for over 
twenty-five years.   does maintain a 200-hour course of training for Sheet Metal Assemblers 
and Riveters (SMAR), which serves a small percentage of the workforce that has been 
transferred from fabrication sub-shops to general assembly.  These workers are mostly 
older SMARs who formerly performed narrowly defined jobs and now need to increase 
skill levels. The shop supervisor decides whether to send them for additional training or for 
ACLC coaching.  
 
The company’s efforts to target cross training carefully and offer it on an as-needed basis 
rely on the shop supervisor to determine the specific skills or tasks. Additionally, HPWO 
level four teams may also request training for their area. The supervisor calls for volunteers 
or approaches individual workers to request that they volunteer for the training. The skill or 
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task is likely to cut across the traditional boundaries of the core crafts.  A sheet metal 
worker might be trained to attach a set of electrical connections that are the next step in the 
completion of a set of tasks. This work was formerly done by an electrician while the sheet 
metal worker waited until the electrician could come and finish that one set of connections. 
Now, the sheet metal worker is sent to training to learn this specific set of tasks.  When he 
or she returns from training, a coach or other worker skilled in this task will do on-the-job 
training as needed to ensure that the work is done properly.  Workers can be sent back for 
retraining if necessary.  The training for many of these tasks is standardized and 
summarized in data sheets.   
 
During the first six months under the agreement (from August 2001 through December 
2001), it was planned that cross training was to be provided to 787 “students” in the 
assembly job family, totaling 6,470 hours.  The parties met and slightly exceeded these 
objectives, with 821 people training for a total of 7,558 hours.11  This pace of training has 
been maintained in the two years since the agreement.  Most importantly, these training 
hours were not achieved by taking large groups of workers off the line for lengthy blocks of 
time.  This was nearly all just-in-time delivery of short modules focused on specific skills. 
 
In 2002, cross training was extended to the flight family as well, totaling 18,143 hours. 
About one fifth of this time was allocated to retrain inspectors on production tasks since 
their role was gradually being replaced through increased use of operator verification. The 
majority of the inspectors were cross-trained as SMARs, the largest classification in the 
assembly family. This is a primary reason why 32% of total cross training in 2002 was 
SMAR training, followed by MER (26%), MEE (14%), MAP (10%), SAP (8%), Flight 
Mechanic (5%) and Common training (5%) (see appendix for a full listing of acronyms and 
definitions) .    
 
The experience with cross training varied across the workforce.  At one end of the 
spectrum, some people reported very little or no change in their daily job. Others were 
cross-trained to do incidental work outside their classification, like the MAP who said: "I 
have been trained to do electrical and sheet metal, but I'm still doing basically mechanical 
work." Yet others reported being more broadly multi-skilled, like the former "All Arounds" 
who were now able to perform a variety of tasks they had trained for in the past. 
Interestingly, there were also some individuals that reported working full-time in another 
classification, like the SMAR who noted: "I'm doing mechanical work now. Pretty much all 
I do now, hardly any more sheet metal." 
 
In order to more fully understand the details of the skill building process, we obtained 
training records for four departments within the facility. As mentioned earlier, these 
departments represent different programs and stages of production, have different sizes and 
shift mixes, and vary on how advanced they are at mastering HPWO. We thus consider 
them “naturally occurring experiments,” in which to examine in detail the training process 
that accompanied the compression of job classifications since 2001 and its relation to 
performance outcomes. We have labeled these as Departments A, B, C, and D for the 
purposes of this study. 
                                                 
11 Note that some workers attended multiple sessions. 
  15
Table 2 
Profile of Departments Selected for Training Data Analysis  
Department HPWO 
Level 
Shift Current 
Number of 
Members  
Composition 
A Level 3-4 1 and 3 27 17 Flt Mech, 6 MEE, 3 
Insp A/C, 1 Painter 
B Level 3 1, 2, and 
3 
34 27 SMAR, 2 Iassy, 2 
MAP, 2 SAP, 1 utility 
worker 
C Level 2 1 11 7 SMAR, 2 MAP, 2 
MER 
D 
  
Level 2 1 and 2 21 9 MAP, 7 SMAR, 4 
MER, 1 Iassy 
 
The training records we had access to go back over twenty years. They represent all the 
formal training courses received by the current members of the department since 1981. This 
means that the records of people who were in the past laid off, retired, transferred to another 
department, etc., are not included (there are only a few individuals whose training records 
ended at some point but have not been expunged). Conversely, people who have transferred 
in from other departments have brought with them all their past training records. We thus 
have a complete picture of the training courses received by these four sets of employees – 
although not of the departments per se – over a long period of time. This gives us a 
remarkable window into how training has changed over the years at . We divided this data 
into three periods:  1) before the 1996 contract, 2) between 1996 and 2001, and 3) after the 
2001 contract. Both these contracts introduced major changes in job classifications. The 
following chart shows the annual average training hours per worker in each of these groups.  
 
These numbers reflect formal training courses only and do not include on-the-job training 
and coach (ACLC) training. They therefore represent just a fraction of the total training 
efforts at the facility.   The following set of charts provides a profile of the skills training 
delivered in each of the four departments: 
 
Chart 1 
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As these charts illustrate, the profiles of the departments vary considerably – with one 
(Department “A”) showing a pattern of significantly increasing investment in training, 
another (Department “C”) showing two different peak periods, and the last two 
(Departments “B” and “D”) showing a steady level of training activity. In the case of 
Department A, this training is largely linked to military procurement contracts, which 
require flight ramp workers to be frequently recertified in certain critical skills. The two 
peaks in Department C reflect spikes in cross training efforts following the 1996 and 2001 
agreements. This department engages in final assembly, an area where there is more scope 
for effective cross-utilization of workers than in previous stages of production. Indeed, 
Department C includes a high proportion of former “All-Arounds,” in contrast to 
Departments B and D, the other two assembly teams. 
 
Chart 2 provides a summary of all training (technical skills and other training) for these 
same four departments, presented in summary form as a bar chart for the three time periods 
before and after the 1996 and 2001 contracts.  Presented this way, we see that the last two 
contracts have brought at least a doubling of the amount of training provided in all four 
departments.   The increase in Department A has been most dramatic under the most recent 
contract, with Department C also showing a further increase.  Since 2001, there has been a 
slight fall off in Departments B and D. 
 
Chart 2 
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The following four charts provide a break-out by types of training in each of the 
departments. In Department A there was substantial investment in training within 
classification.  This department is largely made up of flight mechanics, one of the most 
skilled classifications in the facility, and they are subject to periodic mandated training of 
this type.  There was also a substantial increase in cross training under the new contract.   
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Chart 3 
Department A Training Mix:  Average Annual Training Hours Per Person Over Time
(Before and after 1996 and 2001 contracts)
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In Department B, the amount of training was much less, but the cross training has increased 
substantially – first under the 1996 contract and then maintaining the level of training under 
the 2001 agreement. 
 
Chart 4 
Department B Training Mix:  Average Annual Training Hours Per Person Over TIme
(Before and after 1996 and 2001 contracts)
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Chart 5 
Department C Training Mix:  Average Annual Training Hours Per Person Over Time
(Before and after 1996 and 2001 contracts)
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Departments C and D also saw increases in skills training, though the profiles are different.  
Department C saw a substantial increase in training under the 1996 contract and then a 
further doubling under the 2001 agreement.  Department D experienced a similarly 
substantial jump following the 1996 agreement and then a maintenance of that level of 
training since then.  Department D also experienced substantial in-classification training 
throughout the past decade. 
 
Chart 6 
 
Department D Training Mix:  Average Annual Training Hours Per Person Over Time
(Before and after 1996 and 2001 contracts)
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As the above charts indicate, we have sorted the training into two basic types: skills training 
and other training. Skills training includes, in turn, three subtypes: common technical 
training, training specific to a job classification, and cross training. Cross training happens 
when a course specific to a job classification is taken by someone in a different 
classification. We only have information on the employee’s current classification but can 
assume it to be constant since we know, from interviews, that changes in classification have 
been relatively rare. Other training combines courses on workplace processes and policies 
(e.g., computer software, foreign object debris prevention) with others such as SHEA 
(health, safety and the environment) and HPWO (teams). We also identified OV (operator 
verification and collateral inspection) and PoU (point-of-use logistics) courses, because 
these initiatives also impinge on the flexible utilization of the workforce. 
 
We can see from the above charts that there has been a shift in the composition of training 
since the 2001 agreement.  Prior to the new contract language, in 1996-2001, there was a 
relatively heavier focus on non-skill specific training – such as ethics training or diversity 
training. Following the implementation of the new language, the focus shifted toward 
operator verification and skills training. This suggests that the agreements in the new 
contract are being reflected in the actual behavior of the people in the work system. It also 
reflects the important fact that training budgets have not been increased to accommodate 
the new job family system, thus forcing some reshuffling of training funds. As one of the 
training managers explained: “The lean thing is to not get overhead cost up.”  
 
With respect to HPWO training, there was an increase under the 1996 agreement and more 
recently there has been some fall-off in the training.  Since only one of the teams was on the 
verge of achieving the highest level of development, level 4, it is not clear why this has 
declined. 
 
The following charts compare the content of skills training in each of the four departments 
in the two years before and after the 2001 agreement.  In Department A, flight mechanic 
training accounts for between eighty and nearly ninety percent of the training, which 
reflects the nature of the work.  Beyond that, there has been a shift toward and increased 
focus on electrical and electronics skills training, reflecting the growing utilization of these 
workers for tasks that might previously have been handled by MEEs.   
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Chart 7 
Department A Skills Training by Course Type for Two Time Periods 
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In Department B, the mix of training has shifted in many ways. There has been much less 
training in sheet metal assembly (declining from nearly fifty percent to around eighteen 
percent) and increases in mechanical skills training and other categories.  This experience 
reflects a training program that is responsive to different needs over time. 
 
Chart 8 
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The mix of training in Department C has been more constant over time than Department B, 
as is indicated by Chart 9.   This is also true in Department D, as reflected in Chart 10.  
 
  21
Chart 9 
Department C Skills Training by Course Type for Two Time Periods 
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Chart 10 
Department D Skills Training by Course Type for Two Time Periods 
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The full set of charts on the skill mix and training over time suggest that there is no one 
consistent pattern across departments – with some receiving two or three times as much 
training and with the skills mix varying in different ways in different departments.  This 
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may be reflective of an approach to training that is responsive to different needs in different 
situations and it also may reflect different levels of support and motivation in different 
departments.  
 
Yet another way to examine the mix of training is by job classification.  The following 
charts present the mix of cross training received across different classifications for three 
different time periods (prior to 1996, between 1996 and 2001, and since 2001).  As we see 
in Charts 11 and 13, there were some classifications, such as SMARs or MEEs where there 
was little or no cross-training in the period prior to 1996.  Under both the 1996 and 2001 
agreements there were substantial investments in cross-training for all classifications.  In 
some cases, such as flight mechanics, there were substantial amounts of other training 
associated with skills certification.  Since 2001, the flight mechanics have received large 
amounts of other training associated with skills certification.  In the assembly family, the 
SMARs have also maintained significant levels of within-classification training.  In 
contrast, other less numerous classifications such as SAPs, and MERs receive very little 
training within-classification, while cross-training to do other jobs.  
 
Chart 11 
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Chart 12 
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Chart 13 
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Chart 14 
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Chart 15 
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VI. Concurrent Initiatives 
 
The efforts to increase flexibility and capability can only be understood in the context of 
four concurrent initiatives:  operator verification (OV), high performance work organization 
(HPWO) and direct point of use supplier delivery.  Each of these initiatives is aimed at 
making production more effective and relates to an overall effort to create a more 
functionally flexible workforce and leaner system of aircraft production.   
 
Operator Verification:  Prior to the 2001 contract, a mechanic would put a completed job 
on a call board for an inspector to approve it.   Inspectors would frequently have down time 
waiting for jobs to be placed on call boards, only to be bombarded with jobs at a later 
moment.   Under OV, operators certified in a specific process can inspect their own work, 
preventing unnecessary bottlenecks in production. The average operator is certified in 5 
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processes. Those not OV qualified for a particular process still perform it and then place it 
on the call board as they always have—only a co-worker with collateral inspection 
certification (CI)) for that particular process can “buy off “that work. 
 
Workers received 4 hours of training on the OV process.  They could also move up one 
more step and become trained to do collateral inspection.  This meant that they could 
inspect the work of others and certify its correctness.  Although the number of dedicated, or 
core, inspectors has been reduced since the 
2001 agreement, maintaining the highest 
quality is a universal concern.  In addition to 
operator verification of their own work, the 
company has instituted a layered system of 
inspection with OV supplemented by collateral 
inspection or core inspectors if available.  
While workers can approve their own work, the 
highest level work – “safety of flight” tasks – 
are always inspected by a second worker who is 
either a core inspector or has collateral 
inspection authority to “buy off” work done by 
others.     
 
This process of operator verification is 
consistent with the overall organizational focus 
on the utilization of lean manufacturing 
principles.  It reflects the view that quality is 
best achieved “closest to the source,” by the 
front-line worker.  This represents a shift from 
the responsibility resting with a separate group 
of inspectors.   In fact, many of those who were 
inspectors have returned to production work. 
The remaining core inspectors approve “safety 
of flight” work and carry both random and 
targeted surveillance duties, checking on 
specific jobs and workers that have been 
identified as more likely sources of defects.  
 
HPWO:  The 1996 agreement created a High Performance Work Organization (HPWO) in 
St. Louis.  Under the plan, shop-floor workers were grouped into HPWO teams, with an 
elected team leader.  Teams are encouraged to climb the HPWO steps from a Level 1 to a 
Level 4 team—the latter having nearly complete autonomy to craft goals and to manage and 
schedule their work as well as request training. Today, there are approximately 300 HPWO 
teams across the facility, with 25-30 that have achieved Level 4.  Achieving Level 4 takes a 
minimum of two years and more often longer.  Teams initially receive 16 hours of core 
HPWO training, with team leaders receiving an additional 24 hours of training. 
 
On approximately a quarterly basis there are special dinners in which the teams that have 
achieved Level 4 are honored, with both union and management leaders providing the 
recognition. Team members receive a monetary award at the ceremony. Since 1999, the 
IAM as an Advocate for HPWO 
 
The International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers (IAM) has developed since the 
mid 1990s a strategy of building High Performance 
Work Organization (HPWO) partnerships. The aim 
of the strategy is to provide “a process that will help 
us grow the companies where IAM members work 
and help save and create jobs.” 
 
There are currently over 50 partnerships between the 
union and individual facilities or companies in the 
U.S. and Canada. In a HPWO partnership, the 
partners define a new team-based work system that 
draws on the insights and talents of all employees 
and assigns to them new roles and responsibilities. 
The details of the partnership agreement vary from 
place to place, but they all share some basic 
principles such as joint decision-making, continuous 
learning and skill building, and the sharing of 
information.  
 
IAM headquarters assists locals in the 10-step 
process of designing, implementing and evaluating 
HPWO partnerships. In 1994, it invited both union 
and management at Boeing St. Louis to an initial 
training session. The company rejected the notion of 
full partnership but decided to start some pilots in 
areas that were about to be shut down. This 
eventually led to the conclusion of a HPWO 
agreement in 1996. 
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HPWO Performance Share Plan has also rewarded each worker at the facility according to a 
complex gain-sharing formula. The average payout over the last three years has been 
$1,200.     
 
In general, there is a positive view of teamwork across the workforce.  For example, of the 
34 individuals who completed our individual survey, all but 5 respondents agreed with the 
statement that they preferred a teamwork environment.   In our survey of workers in the 
four departments, the intensity of worker response on the concept of HPWO specifically 
was correlated with the team level, with Level 4 Team members voicing greater enthusiasm 
over the changes that HPWO made in their day-to-day work lives.  Views on the HPWO 
initiative had no direct relationship with the job classifications of the workers.    
 
Point of Use: The 2001 contract also featured language on the transition to a point-of-use 
supplier delivery method. Workers in the support job family would be responsible for 
dispersing the parts from the receiving station to the point of use, although all employees 
would now be expected to assist with this task.  Since 1997, supply chain management at 
the facility has improved inventory turns while reducing the ratio of production control staff 
to direct labor. 
 
Lean Transformation: HPWO, in-process quality control and point-of-use logistics are all 
part of a larger “lean transformation,” with other manifestations of lean directly impacting 
the organization of work at Boeing, St. Louis.  Initially, the HPWO efforts and the lean 
initiatives were separate.  As one of the site’s HPWO coordinators commented, “When lean 
first came in, it was another organization.  There was union push back.  Now HPWO has 
become an umbrella for any change on the shop floor.” 
 
From the perspective of the operators, the most visible manifestation of lean is the shop 
floor itself.  Each of the three shops we visited was clean, bright, and painstakingly efficient 
in layout.  We observed perfectly organized and labeled tool cribs, each individually-
outfitted for its role and place in the production process, freshly-painted and spotless floors, 
meticulously free of dangerous FOD (foreign object debris), such as screws, nuts, and other 
small objects that can get caught in engines and other mechanisms, injuring people and 
damaging planes.  Building 101, the newly opened consolidated production facility for the 
C-17, especially heralds the arrival of lean production.  Built to facilitate point-of-use 
delivery of supplies and pre-fabricated parts, the facility is part of a $140 million plan to 
make Boeing St. Louis the most efficient producer in the industry.12 The production setting 
is designed so that FOD hits the floor instead of collecting in the part itself, while the floor 
color and texture enables its quick detection.  Another manifestation of lean is the 
standardization of tools, in which a specialized toolbox is placed at each work station. 
 
There are larger strategic issues associated with lean transformation.  As the site manager 
explained Boeing St. Louis aims to become more of a systems integrator and less of a 
fabricator of airplane parts, moving up the value chain and abandoning the in-house 
production of low-value-added items. As the company encourages suppliers to provide 
subassemblies and focuses more tightly on the final assembly of aircraft, a different mix of 
skills and capabilities will become more important.  One example of the impact of choosing 
                                                 
12 St. Louis Post Dispatch, 4 June 2002. 
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an integrative strategy is the sale of the fabrication facilities in 2001 to the British firm 
GKN Aerospace Services.  Importantly, Boeing was responsive to union concerns that 
GKN maintain the union status for the workforce that was transferred. There are currently 
837 IAM members working at the new GKN St. Louis site. 
 
Another enterprise-level implication of the lean approach can be found in new product 
development.  All of the platforms produced in this facility undergo periodic re-designs, 
with E/F versions of the F18 being the most recent and pivotal to the future of the 
operation.  Consistent with lean principles, the product redesign also involved detailed 
value stream maps and the direct involvement of production team members on the 
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), which also featured the involvement of customers and 
suppliers.  As one manager commented, “We broke down the wall between design and 
manufacturing.  It used to be that manufacturing was not heavily involved until a few weeks 
before assembly.  Now issues of floor layout and industrial engineering were being 
considered one or two years in advance.” 
 
 
VII. Assessing Outcomes 
 
The Boeing job family initiative can be assessed on two levels of flexibility.  First it can be 
assessed on how well it succeeds in giving the company greater flexibility in the use of its 
workforce.  The cross training is aimed at allowing workers in specific classifications to do 
incidental work that is normally considered the work of other classifications.  At this time 
no worker is required to change classifications but many inspectors are being re-assigned to 
production work.  The job family system is an opportunity to rationalize the work of aircraft 
assembly by allowing one worker to be trained to perform consecutively tasks that were 
once done by several specialized workers. This allows the work to flow more smoothly and 
production to be completed more quickly.  Cost reductions include a decrease in the amount 
of down time spent waiting while another is called in to complete a task. On a second level, 
flexibility could also benefit individual workers through the enlargement of their skills and 
capabilities, enhancing employability. Many workers believe that having more skills can be 
helpful. However, the value of this is diminished by the limited number of alternative job 
opportunities in the St. Louis labor market.   
 
Flexibility and Organizational Outcomes: Linking facility-level output measures and the 
implementation of the job family agreement is not a simple task.  There are many factors 
that influence productivity and quality data in aircraft production such as the actual orders 
received, changes in design, production schedules, subcontracting, or changes in work 
organization such as the implementation of lean manufacturing principles. Management 
reports that increased ability to cross-utilize workers has led to gains in productivity, 
scheduling and cost savings.  A senior production manager commented, for instance, that 
“The F-18 program is ahead of schedule and a five-year goal to reduce defects by 19% was 
reached in just 3 years.” This is all the more remarkable given that there was also a major 
reduction in budget costs. “Even with the added cost of all the learning we’ve still hit all the 
targets.”  An IAM representative stated, “We have experienced significant productivity 
gains as a result of the labor grade plan…under the old contract we were finishing 36 F-
18’s a year; now we will finish 44. That’s a 22% increase in delivered aircraft with fewer 
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bodies.” Production managers from other programs also stressed that “our rates have 
increased but we haven’t increased manpower.”  
 
In regards to quality, company metrics show that defects per 1,000 standard hours have 
been at or below plan since January 2002. Defect figures have markedly improved 
compared to 1998 and 1999, but they are difficult to interpret because the method used to 
measure them changed in 2002. The next chart features rework/repair hours per 1,000 
standard work hours, which were not affected by this change. We can see that rework/repair 
costs have declined 47% since 1999 (with 1999 figures used as a baseline). While the 
decline started well before the implementation of the 2001 agreement, it has leveled off to a 
large degree in 2002 and 2003.   
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Despite these data, many of the workers we interviewed about the new inspection approach 
said that they preferred having, like in the past, a “second set of eyes” checking their work. 
Some of the workers also voiced a desire not to take away the jobs of inspectors.. Among 
those doing collateral inspection, some felt this new task frequently forced them to interrupt 
their regular work. In most cases, the same individuals that had become multi-skilled 
through cross training were also those engaged in collateral inspection. They sometimes 
reported that other employees were not asked to take on additional tasks while they were 
not being paid any extra money for their efforts.   
 
Charts 18- 21 represent a preliminary analysis of outcomes.  Each chart includes monthly 
summaries of skills training hours, combined with monthly data on productivity (as 
measured by what Boeing terms the Realization Factor or the RF) and repair costs 
(normalized based on the expended hours that month).  Increases in the RF are favorable – 
they represent performance that exceeds what would be expected at the staff levels and with 
the other inputs during a given time period.  Decreases in repair costs are favorable, by 
contrast.  These tables do point to some possible relationships between training and these 
performance outcomes, but further analysis will be needed to examine concurrent factors, 
effects of different types of training, lagged effects and other possible relationships between 
training investments and performance outcomes.  This analysis will be continuing on the 
part of the MIT research team. 
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Chart 18 
 
Monthly Training Hours and Selected Performance Outcomes: 
Department A
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Chart 19 
 
Monthly Training Hours and Selected Performance Outcomes: 
Department B
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Chart 20 
Monthly Skills Training Hours and Selected Performance Outcomes: 
Department C
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
20
01
q1
20
01
q2
20
01
q3
20
01
q4
20
02
q1
20
02
q2
20
02
q3
20
02
q4
20
03
q1
20
03
q2
A
ll 
Th
re
e 
O
ut
co
m
es
 N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 to
 J
an
ua
ry
 2
00
1 
B
as
e=
10
0
Skills Training Hours
Repair Costs/Expended Hours
Productivity (Realization Factor)
Peak Observation = 1,680
 
 
 
Chart 21 
 
Monthly Skills Training Hours and Selected Performance Outcomes: 
Department D
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Flexibility and Individual Outcomes: For those workers who volunteer, training is 
available to allow them to do a greater percentage of the work needed to assemble an 
airplane.  They can inspect and pass on the quality of their own work after a relatively small 
amount of training.  Those who chose to take more training can do collateral inspection, 
which allows them to inspect and pass on the quality of the work of their co-workers.  
These are markedly different types of tasks and do allow the individual worker, who 
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chooses to take on the inspection duties, greater variety and responsibility in their daily 
routines.   
 
This trend toward greater autonomy is also apparent in the high performance work team 
structure that exists in the plant.  Teams take on ever more responsibility and greater shares 
of the tasks once performed by supervisors such as scheduling and some budgeting.  As the 
teams progress they rise through four levels until they reach Level Four status.  In this level 
the team still has a supervisor but his or her duties have changed so that the supervisor 
provides resources and facilitates  the daily operations of the team.  If a worker is in a Level 
Four team and participating in the cross trained work, he or she may be experiencing a high 
degree of variation and change in the work area. 
 
A sample of 34 individuals from the four departments completed a survey that included a 
number of questions regarding the new work system.  On the one hand, they confirmed that 
this set of initiatives is delivering on the organizational goal of increased flexibility.  A total 
of 24 of the 34 respondents agreed with the statement that, “I have learned more tasks and 
increased my flexibility.”  Similarly, 24 of the respondents agreed with the statement that, 
“My job makes good use of my skills and abilities.”  On the other hand, only 11 of these 
respondents agreed with the statement that, “Increasing my skill level will help me maintain 
employment” and just 16 agreed with the statement that, “Learning new work practices will 
increase my employability.”    
 
It is inevitable that the impending layoff had an impact on the attitudes of these workers.  In 
interviews they were proud of their performance and understood the importance of team-
based work.  They could see the logic behind the cross training in terms of the work flow 
and they indicated that they enjoyed being able to do different types of tasks.  Unfortunately 
the potential for greater individual employability outside of Boeing does not seem to exist.  
The St. Louis labor market in which this skilled group of workers competes is either Boeing 
or a nearby Chrysler automobile factory.  Consistent with the survey results, only a few 
stated during interviews that any of the new skills they acquire would  result in improved 
employment opportunities once they have left Boeing.   
   
 
VIII. Implications for Practice 
 
In one sense, the shift to job families is a relatively simple, incremental change.  In another 
sense, it requires significant realignment for line management, the union and all support 
functions in the organization.  The full scope of the impact is greater, of course, as a result 
of the concurrent initiatives around Operator Verification (OV), High Performance Work 
Organization (HPWO), and Lean Enterprise Transformation. 
 
Front-Line Workers.  The front-line workers are at the heart of this movement to 
increased flexibility through investment in skills and training.  On the one hand, they are 
the beneficiaries of increased investment in skills and capability, increased responsibility 
for quality, and the ability to suggest improvements in operations through their HPWO 
teams.  On the other hand, the degree to which these new arrangements are valued is 
complex.  At the outset of this case, we noted the alignment with the Hackman and Oldham 
job design framework, which highlights five core dimensions to a successful job redesign 
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initiative.13  These are: Skill variety, Task identity, Task significance, Autonomy, and 
Feedback.  These dimensions combine to create three critical psychological states that 
affect individual motivation and job satisfaction: meaningfulness, personal responsibility, 
and knowledge of results.  If this theoretical model is applied to the situation at Boeing St. 
Louis, it is clear that this meets all the criteria of a successful job redesign.   
 
Table 3: Applying the Job Design Model to the Case 
 
Hackman and Oldham’s Definitions of 
Core Job Dimensions 
Evidence of Core Job Dimensions in 
Boeing/IAM Job Family Plan 
 
Skill Variety -- the degree to which a job 
requires a variety of different activities in 
carrying out the work and which use different 
skills and talents of the person.  
 
Workers are encouraged to volunteer to learn 
and perform tasks from other  classifications. 
 
Task Identity -- the degree to which the job 
requires completion of a "whole" and 
identifiable piece of work. Doing a job from 
beginning to end with a visible outcome. 
 
The cross training is targeted at allowing a 
worker to perform a sequence of tasks rather 
than split up those tasks among various 
classifications and workers. 
 
Task Significance -- the degree to which the 
job has a substantial impact on the lives or 
work of other people.  
 
Building an airplane is work that requires 
constant attention to detail and safety of-flight 
issues. 
 
Autonomy -- the degree to which the job 
provides substantial freedom, independence, 
and discretion to the individual in scheduling 
the work and in determining the procedures to 
be used in carrying it out. 
 
The growing high performance work 
organization or team-based work system is 
increasing the levels of autonomy and 
decision-making authority that individual 
workers have.  In addition the operator 
verification program empowers workers to 
inspect and pass their own work. 
 
Feedback -- the degree to which carrying out 
the work activities required by the job results in 
the individual's obtaining direct and clear 
information about the effectiveness of his or 
her performance.  
 
Team-based performance data are available to 
each worker as are the program and facility 
performance statistics.  Workers also receive 
feedback from their peers through the 
collateral and traditional inspection programs. 
What then would prevent this redesign from being classified as a great success?   A key 
issue centers on the attitudes of the workers, who are not optimistic about the overall 
employment situation. For example, only 4 of the 34 participants completing the individual 
survey indicated that they would recommend that their children come to work in the 
aerospace industry, which is consistent with a larger sample of over 500 respondents asked 
the same question in nine other aerospace facilities where we have completed related case 
study research. They also report that there is decreased trust in both the union and 
                                                 
13   J. R. Hackman and G. R. Oldham, "Development of the Job Diagnostic Survey", Journal of Applied 
Psychology, vol. 60, 1975, pp 159-170.  
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management leadership since the 2001 contract negotiations.  It is impossible to know how 
different these responses would have been had there been no lay offs, had there been an 
upsurge in sales, or even if other comparable jobs were available in this labor market.  
At the Boeing St. Louis plant and in the surrounding area the success of the job redesign 
may also rest on the perceived or real efficacy of the cross training in assuring that the 
workers have employment.  For the cross training to be helpful in terms of employability, it 
must be thorough and there must be a place in the labor market to sell those skills.  Further, 
because the cross training is for discrete tasks, the fit of the training with existing 
certification standards is a concern.  As one worker commented, "My A&P license, that's 
my employability. Here I'm a SMAR. They won't know I was also a mechanic. I will put it 
in my resume but I don't think it will help me."  On the other hand, another worker stated: 
"It will make me more employable – all these teaming skills:  job family, HPWO..."  But 
then he added: "I don't know what I would do if I'm laid off. This is the only place I have 
worked in."  
 
Thus job redesign success does not rely solely on the intrinsic effect it has on the workers 
involved.  .External factors like competition, levels of economic well-being,  corporate 
strategy, and the culture of the organizations all play formative roles in outcomes.  In this 
case, the company and the union were captive to a procurement decision derived from an 
intensely competitive governmental acquisition system.  The events of September 11, 2001 
greatly magnified the overall economic weaknesses that had begun to develop in both 
commercial and defense aerospace markets.  All these elements  will influence the 
perceived success of current efforts at the plant. 
 
A further complicating factor is the existence of an age gap between those who take on new 
tasks, who tend to be younger, and those workers with more seniority who are not seeking 
as many training opportunities. If lay offs continue, many of the employees who are more 
flexible and multi-skilled, like the “All-Arounds”, will be leaving the workforce, taking that 
training and expertise. These are the very workers who exemplify the types of machinists 
that Boeing hopes will inhabit the new job families. At the same time, there is a portion of 
the current workforce that would be able to retire if they chose to do so, although past 
incentives for early retirement had limited success.  The result is a complicated set of 
exchanges.  For example, one worker commented:  "There is a precision guy who is being 
laid off on Friday. He was teaching me this job that only he and another guy know – he is 
also being laid off. I was the one taking their job. You could feel the tension."   
 
As the demographic cliff of an aging workforce becomes an imminent threat, the base of 
skills embedded in it takes on new dimensions.   The company’s operations assume the 
presence of this skill base every day.  Clearly, when the minimum seniority of a group of 
workers is 15 to 18 years, there are many things they do not need to be told.  They know 
what tool works best for each task, which parts are often flawed, which procedures are 
trickier than others, what a specific sound means when a tool has too much torque.   
 
As these workers retire and Boeing brings in new workers, the model of targeted skill 
acquisition in this location will have important implications. The initial training might 
become less extensive, given the prospect of further training and learning opportunities 
throughout a career. At the same time, the flexibility that is now expected from workers, 
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and the fact that this facility is moving out of fabrication, suggests that future hires will 
need higher educational credentials (i.e., Airframe & Power Plant Mechanic licenses) 
and/or military experience in order to be assured the capability to utilize what could be a 
life-long flow of training investments. 
 
Line Management.  For front-line supervisors, this increased flexibility has enabled them 
to assure an improved work flow and increased quality.  It has, however, required these 
individuals to build greater expertise in disaggregating job components in order to request 
targeted training support.  Moreover, these individuals have had to develop their own 
coaching skills much more deeply.  Coaching is needed in the utilization of new skills as 
well as with respect to the increased use of Operator Verification and the movement of 
HPWO teams to higher levels. For instance, Level Four teams can schedule themselves and 
may have control over whether workers cross crafts or not. Many of the front-line 
supervisors have successfully made this shift, but not all.  Unfortunately, it only takes a few 
incidents of supervisors providing more traditional command and control leadership – 
focusing on “getting the product out the door” – to raise doubts in worker’s minds about the 
organization’s commitment to these initiatives.  Hence, the realignment of front-line 
leadership skills and management style represents a key area for continued attention in this 
initiative. 
 
For more senior managers, this has required a complete inversion of the typical, top-down 
mindset.  They still hold front-line operations accountable for delivering results on cost, 
quality, and schedule performance, but they must also take a much more proactive role in 
ensuring that these operations have the tools, resources and support needed to accomplish 
these goals.  This is because the lean approach increases performance by placing greater 
responsibility for performance on front-line operations.  Instead of viewing training as a 
nice, add-on activity when time permits, for example, it has become a key enabler of work 
flow.  In a context where training budgets are traditionally the first to be cut, this requires a 
shift in approach at the more senior management levels. 
 
In motivating the shift, the site manager summarizes the message for managers as follows, 
“Everyone wants to go back to the good old days.  Well, the good old days are tomorrow.” 
 
Union Leadership:  Although the increased investment in workforce skills represents a 
core union priority, it has also surfaced many challenges and dilemmas for the union.  As 
one local union leader commented:  “We’re all for efficiency and quality but let’s get there 
with everyone on board.”  There is always a tension between the independent 
responsibilities of a union and its role as a strategic partner with management.  In this case, 
the union has maintained its partnership role despite many forces pulling in opposite 
directions.   
 
Currently, the workforce that is still employed is quite senior and expects to have its 
seniority rights protected.  The ability to translate enhanced skills into secure employment 
is an essential element of the overall bargain that the union and management negotiated.  
The benefits that might have been gained by the award of the Joint Strike Fighter contract 
were substantial and demanded an increased level of competitiveness from Boeing.  The 
combined loss of the JSF and the downturn in the economy after September 11, 2001 has 
reduced the employment security potential of this agreement.  A further aspect of 
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employment security might have been realized if the enhanced skills of the workforce 
translated to greater employability in the region.  But in the St Louis area this also seems to 
be limited by the small number of comparable employers. The benefits to the workforce of 
portability associated with the job family training will require a mechanism that is not just 
limited to the St. Louis area..   
 
Summing up the union perspective, the local union President  observed, “People were 
initially skeptical of the HPWO efforts as just another ‘flavor of the month.’  That was back 
in 1995 when we first started talking about this and it is still here.  Today, some people are 
very pleased with the job families and others still have concerns.  There is more that is 
needed to have a full partnership, but we are proud of what we have accomplished.” 
 
Human Resource Function:  The Human Resource function has had to significantly adjust 
its operations in order to be aligned with the more flexible structure of work.  First, the 
training function has undergone a major cultural transformation in order to shift from the 
scheduled “push” model of training to the just-in-time “pull” model of training.   Second, 
the labor relations staff has had to place even greater emphasis on building and maintaining 
partnership relations with the union, not just negotiating collective bargaining contracts and 
administering the grievance procedure.  This is particularly challenging considering that the 
number of labor relations staff has been reduced over the past decade from 18 to 5. The new 
contract language eliminated what was the main source of grievances in the past: the 
crossing of craft lines. However, people have continued to grieve over this issue in regards 
to overtime, which is still governed by the old job classification rules.  Third, the process of 
performance appraisal and career planning has had to expand to take into account the 
efforts of supervisors and managers who are, or are not, working aggressively to support the 
new work system. 
 
Quality Function:  The movement to operator verification represents a fundamental shift 
from a model of inspecting in quality to a model of building in quality.  As the Manager of 
Quality commented, “Perhaps no organization has had to change as much as [the] quality 
[function].”  He was referring to the shift from managing a staff of quality inspectors and 
supervisors to delivering quality through the front-line workforce.  The mechanisms for 
delivering quality in this way are Operator Verification training, related cross training, and 
the HPWO structure.  “This is not a pilot experiment,” he added.  “We drew a line in the 
sand and said from now on we will handle quality differently.  Initially, it was not popular 
with the inspectors or the mechanics, but there is only a small group that remains flat out 
against what we are doing.”  While safety of flight quality inspection is still handled in the 
traditional fashion, ninety percent of workers are now doing some “buy-off” of their own 
work.  This involved extensive pre-briefings with key customers, who were initially 
skeptical about this process. 
 
Production Control and Supply Chain Management:  In the Production Control 
organization, there has been a significant shift associated with delivering materials to the 
“point of use” on a “pull” basis – both within the operations and through external suppliers.  
As suppliers increase the amount of line-side delivery of materials, the size of the 
workforce in this function has been reduced.  Approximately half the workforce remains, 
with most of the displaced workers redeployed to other parts of the operation.  This has 
been enabled by still-experimental long-term agreements for a selected number of suppliers.   
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The company has also set up partnership agreements with a number of universities, 
including the University of Michigan, the University of Kentucky, MIT and others, in order 
to deliver new training in supply chain management. 
 
Finance Function:  Traditionally, the finance function has “faced upwards,” providing 
financial reports on performance outcomes to enable senior managers to make strategic 
decisions.  Now, however, the HPWO teams are requesting regular feedback on cost, 
quality and schedule performance at the team level, in a format that is easily 
understandable.  This converts the finance function into a front-line service role, which is a 
significant shift.  As the Manager of Finance commented, “We are not accustomed to 
having to get data to the floor, but it is really a small step from the direction that we were 
already headed, which involved managing data in smaller chunks.  We are still learning 
how to best display data so that it will be well understood.”  He went on to add that, “Now 
that we are building this capability, the site manager recently asked us to examine the 
relationship between teams and performance.  We had only been tracking performance 
down to the department level.”  
 
One unique challenge faced by the finance function in the launch of the new training 
system involved establishing training budgets for each department.  As the Finance 
Manager commented, “The goal was to support as much training as possible, delivered in a 
timely fashion so that it would be put to use.  During the first year, the supervisors 
estimated how much training would be needed and we had to build those hours into our 
budgets and our overhead calculations.”   
 
 
IX. Implications for Policy 
 
The new job family system at  allows greater flexibility in the work that individual 
employees can do, helping the company to optimize labor costs.  It also offers the 
workforce greater variety in their daily work, opportunities for skill enrichment, and greater 
input in the production of each aircraft. Training at this facility has more than doubled since 
1996, when ACLC coaching and cross training programs were first introduced. It has 
evolved in recent years, with a focus now on short training modules that are targeted to the 
specific needs of each team or work area and delivered on a just-in-time basis.  
 
The long-term impact and policy implications of these innovations on skills acquisition is 
less clear, however. The policy implications operate on many levels.  First, there are the 
specific policy challenges embedded in this situation, which center on the portability of 
skills.  Then there are the larger policy challenges posed if this, more flexible model of 
training and operations becomes widespread and replaces more traditional training models 
centered on craft-specific apprenticeships.   
 
Portability of Skills:  Cross training for the new job families is for specific tasks or sets of 
tasks, based on the needs of each team or work area. In contrast to the former “All 
Arounds,” who got extensive training in order to master all four specializations in the 
assembly family, both the amount and the content of training workers receive now varies 
from case to case. This means that individual workers will accumulate different skill mixes 
  39
over time, which raises the question: How can these added skills be recognized in order to 
make them portable across firms?  
 
In today’s knowledge economy, many workplaces undergo rapid technological and 
organizational change that requires continuous learning. Advanced industrial countries are 
grappling with the issue of how to make learning outside formal educational and training 
institutions more visible.14 A 1995 white paper from the European Union recommended, for 
instance, developing a European “personal skills card,” as a new and more flexible proof of 
qualifications and competencies. This recommendation has not yet been implemented and 
there are different views on whether such a card would simply document skills or would 
need to be linked to specific skill standards.15  There have been similar initiatives explored 
at the state and federal levels in the U.S.  The Boeing St Louis case would support such 
policy measures.  For example, issuing a “skills passport” for aerospace industry would 
allow for the documentation of individual skill building, which may or may not match to 
established industry standards. A further adjustment of industry standards to be more 
modular would be a valuable complement, since it would help to assure workers and 
customers that the targeted, just-in-time training was also sufficiently rigorous based on an 
external standard.     
 
Apprenticeships: One avenue by which workers have traditionally been trained for highly 
skilled work is through apprenticeships.   Boeing St. Louis has in the past had 
apprenticeship training but the program has been inactive for over twenty-five years. What 
will happen in the not-so-distant future when many in the current workforce retire and new 
workers are brought in from the street? Most likely, the new entrants will be hired into the 
job families rather than the old job classifications. Would the job families provide then the 
core for a new form of apprenticeship training? 
 
In the short run, it is unlikely that we will see the development of a new apprenticeship 
structure at Boeing St Louis.  This is not due to the job families per se, but a likely result of 
the way training has shifted into a “pull” just-in-time model. Given this capability, it is 
possible that initial in-house training may become shorter when a new worker is hired, but 
the intensity of training will persist throughout an individual’s career.  At the same time, the 
flexibility that is now expected from workers, and the fact that this facility is moving out of 
fabrication, suggests that new hires will have vocational education  credentials and/or 
military experience that assures they are well-grounded on fundamental skills.  In this 
regard, the experience at , surfaces the idea of a life-long learning model, with a more 
modular form of standards and certification. 
     
Skill Standards and Certification:  Currently there are programs in the St. Louis area that 
offer Airframe and Power Plant (A&P) licenses based on standards  set  by the Federal 
                                                 
14 The following discussion is drawn from “Making Learning Visible: Identification, Assessment and 
Recognition of Non-Formal Learning in Europe,” CEDEFOP , the European Center for the Development of 
Vocational Training, 2000. 
15 France is one of the most forward countries on this issue, opening up diplomas and certificates that can be 
obtained on the basis of assessments of non-formal learning. Germany and Austria, on the other hand, have 
been the most reluctant to embrace this trend, maintaining a strong focus on initial, apprenticeship training.      
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Aviation Administration.16  This certification offers an overall grounding in the types of 
skills that mechanics need to work on aircraft and is accepted worldwide.  Many of those 
we interviewed in St. Louis had obtained this certification prior to working at Boeing.  
Unfortunately, one long-standing program will not be available in the St. Louis area after 
December 2003: the Parks College at St. Louis University is closing the A&P program after 
75 years due to the impact of the general downturn in the aerospace industry.  The Director 
of the Aviation Maintenance Institute reported that there are currently under 20 students in 
the program, all of whom will be finished in August.17  He identified two other programs 
that might be available to do A & P training in the  area; one trains a small group of high 
school students and the other is at South Western Illinois College, which also has a small 
group of approximately 20 students enrolled.  The director contrasted the situation in 
aerospace mechanic training as he sees it at Parks College, with a training model in 
automobile mechanic training.  The following chart illustrates the points of comparison. 
 
Table 4 
Comparison of Aerospace and Automotive Mechanic Certification 
 
 Airframe and Power Plant  
Mechanic Certification   
Automobile Mechanic 
Certification 
Funding Student funded – 
approximately $17,000 for 
program tuition 
Dealership support through 
training wage that covers 
costs of tuition 
Standards Set by FAA and in need of 
update 
Factory standards updated 
as needed by dealers  
Training Program One year – 5 days a week, 8 
hours a day  
Two years – 8 weeks 
classroom focus and then 8 
weeks hands-on paid work. 
Employment 
Options 
Student must find work after 
training completed 
Student generally hired at 
dealership after training 
completed 
 
It is not difficult to see why the automotive mechanic training program might be more 
attractive to young people choosing a career. 18  The Aviation Maintenance Institute 
director was  also concerned that there is no pipeline of trained personnel moving along to 
enter the industry and that when the full impact of the looming demographic cliff is felt in 
aerospace, there will be no remedy for the lack of trained personnel. Moreover, the A&P 
certification itself  is, in his view,  in dire need of updating.   Title 14 CFR (Code of Federal 
Regulations) Part 147 needs to be updated to remove what he saw as outdated but still 
mandated subjects.  
Canada’s recent efforts in aerospace training may be instructive here. The Canadian 
Aircraft Maintenance Council (CAMC) was established in 1991 in response to a critical 
                                                 
16    For an overview of these programs see the following websites  http://umet-vets.dol.gov/airframe-
mechanic.htm;  http://stats.bls.gov/oco/ocos179.htm 
17 Notes from telephone interview with Fred D. Dyen at Parks College of Engineering and Aviation at St. 
Louis University on October 7, 2003. 
18 Note that the St. Louis Community College has plans to create an Advanced Manufacturing Center at their 
Florissant Valley campus.   
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shortage of skilled personnel in the aviation maintenance industry.  Four primary goals 
were set for the Council: “defining occupational standards for the industry; establishing 
training programs and core curricula, recruiting new entrants to the industry; and 
developing ongoing mechanisms for industry-wide resource planning.19” CAMC is 
organized as a non-profit consortium led by a staff and a Board of Directors with input from 
the industry.  The Board of Directors is comprised of an equal number of employer and 
employee organizations, each with one representative on the board.  The member 
organizations are: The Air Transport Association of Canada, the Aerospace Industry 
Association of Canada, the Canadian Business Aircraft Association, the International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, the Canadian Federation of AME 
Associations, the Department of National Defense/Air Command and the National Training 
Association.   
The organization members each represent a vital group of stakeholders in the aerospace 
industry.  Together they have created a system that works to assure an adequate supply of 
skilled aviation mechanics across all segments of the Canadian industry.  The Canadian 
system includes a tracking system that allows employers to evaluate mechanics’ experience 
levels at the time they are hired.  Each mechanic has a logbook that is filled out to reflect 
the types of work the mechanic has done or the competencies they have acquired in their 
work.  CAMC also has worked to create standardized base skills through curricular and 
licensing consistency.  These regulations apply to all aviation mechanics in Canada whether 
they are unionized or not.   
The Council provides a forum for all stakeholders in the industry to meet and discuss issues 
of common interest. As the projected staffing shortages were identified, it became clear that 
standards for curricula and certification would make it possible for employers to hire 
workers with greater certainty that they possessed needed skills. CAMC was successful 
where a unilateral attempt by Transport Canada to accomplish many of these same 
activities was never able to provide the same levels of service to the industry.   
CAMC is currently sponsoring the third human resources study for its membership.  The 
study is focused on “forecasting human resource (HR) requirements” for aviation sectors 
for the next five, ten, and fifteen years.  As with previous studies, this report will map the 
current state of the industry, outline the specific occupational tasks and technologies 
reviewed, preview technology trends, review employment practices, training, skills bases, 
demographics and recruitment, and make recommendations for the future.  The report 
provides a comprehensive resource for all stakeholders.  Such a knowledge resource does 
not appear to exist or have been undertaken on a national level in the United States but 
could be invaluable to the U.S. industry. 
Human Capital Considerations:  Economists have long recognized that, in the absence of 
some institutional framework, markets will fail to produce an adequate supply of skills. In 
his classic contribution, economics Nobel prize Gary Becker.20 made a distinction between 
“general training,” i.e., that which increases a worker’s productivity to many employers, 
                                                 
19  Information drawn from the Canadian Aviation Maintenance Council website at 
http://www.camc.ca/new/faq.html as well as through interviews with Carlos DaCosta, Board Member from 
the International Association of Machinists.  
20 Gary S. Becker, (1964 [1993]). Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis with special reference 
to education (3rd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
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and “specific training,” i.e., that which increases productivity only in a single firm.  Becker 
predicted that under spot-market conditions, employers would never pay for general 
training—doing so would make their workers ripe for poaching, thereby robbing firms of 
the returns to training investments.  While workers themselves would be willing to invest in 
their own general “human capital,”  they would be likely to under-invest, as the social 
return on education would exceed their individual return. .  In the US, policymakers long 
ago remedied this market failure with the state provision of education and compulsory 
schooling laws. A similar problem arises in regards to training that is not firm-specific, but 
rather industry-specific.  Neither firms nor individuals could be induced to fund such skill-
building in the absence of an institutional arrangement for ensuring that skills are 
standardized, recognized, and rewarded in a way that demonstrates their fungibility and 
properly appropriates the return to the investor.  With help from the DoL’s Employment 
and Training Administration and its ancestral agencies, individual industries have long 
recognized the training “externality” and have developed apprenticeship programs to ensure 
a steady supply of highly-skilled, industry-specialized workers.21  In industries that are not 
organized, other mechanisms for information-sharing and for guaranteeing skill 
universality, including the IT industry’s use of the internet, have allowed the DoL to 
continue to play the vital institutional role required to correct for an otherwise sub-optimal 
market equilibrium. 
After decades of downsizing, the aerospace industry is approaching a “demographic cliff” 
that could easily result in a shortage of skilled personnel. In the defense sector of the 
industry, the average age of the production workforce is 53 and over one fourth is eligible 
for retirement in the next five years. Numbers in the commercial sector are similar, as are 
the numbers for engineers and managers. Some companies are reportedly resorting to 
incentives to bring back retired employees as contractors, but this is just a short-term fix.   
With the potential for a skills shortage in the industry, existing apprenticeships and 
educational programs in aerospace need to be calibrated. This might mean, for instance, 
updating A&P and other licensing standards to reflect current technologies and practices. It 
also involves adjusting apprenticeship programs to the firms’ demand for more flexible, 
multi-skilled workers, as well as paying attention to the interface between initial and 
continuous training.     
 
Boeing, St Louis is not alone in aerospace in moving towards broader job classifications. 
Pratt & Whitney has reportedly tried to merge job classifications. Lockheed Martin’s 
Dallas/Fort Worth plant, which builds the new Joint Strike Fighter, has also combined job 
classifications in its last contract. Similar to Boeing St Louis, the blue-collar workforce at 
the Dallas/Fort Worth facility shrunk from 15,000 in the 1980s to 2,300 in the year 2000. 
However, some 1,700 new workers have been hired in the last two years. The company is 
reportedly having problems finding skilled labor and has engaged with suppliers in the 
Forth Worth area in building a consortium to address this issue. This makes for a potentially 
interesting complement to the  case in that the move toward flexibility is taking place in 
what are now emerging to be skill shortages. 
 
                                                 
21 Slichter, S. H., Healy, J. J., & Livernash, E. R. (1960). The impact of collective bargaining on management. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
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X.  Conclusion:   
 
The combination of flexible job classifications and just-in-time delivery of modular training 
at , represents an important innovation with significant policy implications.  While it would 
be premature to abandon traditional apprenticeship models based on this one case, it is a 
case that points to the emergence of a set of practices for which this traditional model is less 
well suited.  It also represents an approach to training that complements the new work 
systems and lean principles that are permeating the industry.  Moreover, the specific 
sequence of events in this case is instructive about the process by which training practices 
evolve. 
 
The early experience with the “All-Arounds” and other initial efforts to increase flexibility 
suggest that business operations and worker interests are hard to address with a training 
model that involves multiple weeks off the job and splits between workers who are or are 
not in the flexible utilization category.  The experience since the 2001 agreement points to 
an alternative model where training is organized in small modular sessions, delivered 
within a few days of the identified need, and distributed across the full workforce. 
 
This new model of training does not operate in isolation.  It depends on the larger, lean 
model of manufacturing that places a higher value on continued flow in operations and 
front-line capability (particularly with respect to quality).  The HPWO team system is a key 
complementary enabler – with teams playing important roles in the training process and the 
team culture providing a complementary climate.   
 
While this just-in-time approach to training is well matched to the new work system, its 
decentralized nature is both a strength and a weakness.  Training is now much better 
matched to specific front-line circumstances in each work area, but it is also harder to 
document in ways that are transportable.  This gets to a core policy implication.  If 
employers increasingly move to this sort of a training model, it poses a great challenge to 
traditional mechanisms for skills certification that are centered on the focused accumulation 
of a defined body of knowledge within a set period of time.  Instead, the body of knowledge 
being accumulated by the workforce at Boeing St. Louis varies with each worker and will 
likely continue throughout their careers.  A key challenge for the future will involve 
developing more systematic ways to document and value these investments in skills and 
capabilities.   
 
A key questions concerns just how representative the  case is.  Recent survey research on 
aerospace manufacturing facilities suggests that approximately one third to one half of these 
facilities feature the use of team-based work systems and/or lean principles and practices.22  
This would be the set of facilities in which the innovations featured here might be 
applicable.   
 
The implementation of the innovative practices featured in this case has been complicated 
by the difficult economic climate in which the parties operate – including the unsuccessful 
                                                 
22 Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld.  “Lean Transformation Across the U.S. Aerospace Industry:  Exploring the 
Interdependence of Social and Technical Systems” (MIT Sloan and ESD working paper, 2003). 
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bid for a major new product and the overall decline in demand for existing products.  The 
accomplishments of the parties are that much greater given that they have occurred in this 
context of deep employment security fears and economic constraints.   With continued 
organizational and economic instability, however, it is also clear that there will be more 
challenges yet to come   
 
In many ways, the experiences of the IAM and Boeing St. Louis are illustrative of a 
fundamental tension found across the manufacturing sector.  On the one hand, this case 
illustrates how investment in human capital can be done in effective ways that add value to 
the enterprise and increase individual capability.  On the other hand, this case also 
illustrates how these investments are vulnerable to competing pressures to outsource work 
and restructure enterprises.  This points to a larger challenge for policy and practice, which 
centers on the degree to which investments in human capability are valued as vehicles for 
economic development and societal stability.   
 
Labor and management in this location can rightfully be proud of having found an effective 
way to balance worker’s interests in continued seniority protections and management’s 
interest in increased flexibility and flow of operations.   They can also be proud of having 
developed innovative models for the delivery of training on a just-in-time basis with on-the-
job coaching.  They have accomplished this through joint, labor-management efforts, 
building on the foundation of HPWO teams and lean production principles.  The model 
developed by  and the IAM has proven more sustainable than the earlier efforts in this 
location, though the road ahead is marked by continued competitive challenges.  It is 
because of the success to date of this more flexible model of skill development that policy 
analysis is called for – so that national training policy properly anticipates and complements 
such initiatives. 
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Appendix 
Interviewers’ Protocol:  IAM/Boeing St. Louis 
 
Questions are listed in Bold – Key points of information needed are listed as sub items  
 
Introduction: 
 
Thank you for participating in this interview especially in what we know must a stressful time.  
It is part of a research project that  is being conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology under funding from the U.S. Department of Labor.  The project has the approval 
and support of Boeing and the IAM.  Your participation in this interview is voluntary – if you 
are uncomfortable with any questions, you don’t have to answer them (consent form here).  Our 
main focus is on issues of training, skills, job classification, work systems and employment 
issues.  We have a series of general questions, with various details that are of interest in each 
case.  Shall we begin? 
 
1. Please give a brief overview of your work history in the aerospace industry. 
Classification currently 
Length of employment 
Variety of work 
List of employers 
Skills acquisition  
 
2. How is your work day different with the new labor grade/job family model? 
New tasks 
Assessment of the situation 
 
3. Are there any new tasks that you particularly enjoy or dislike? 
Operator Verification? 
 
4. Can you describe the types of training you received to prepare you for the new labor 
grade/ job family model? 
Yes/no on training 
How long did it take? 
Process of the training – who made the decision over whether you got what type of 
training – did you choose or did management choose  
 
5. How do you feel about cross-training? 
Trying to get some indication of the attitudes about pride in craft, prestige 
associated with training, etc. 
Is there trade off between breadth and depth? 
 
6. How does this relate to your experience with HPWO and teams?  What opportunities 
are there for you to give input into how your work is done? 
When and where and in what areas; how to organize work; whether the teams work 
smoothly or not 
 
7. Do you feel that the new labor grade/job family model offers you opportunities for 
advancement or increases your employment options? 
What opportunities? 
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       8.  Is there anything else that we should be aware of to understand what’s happening 
here? 
 
Thank you for participating in this project. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
  
Survey on the Impact of         
Change in the Aerospace Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This survey measures the impact of changes in the job classification system at Boeing 
St. Louis  on individual workers and managers.  This includes changes in work 
practices, training and employment opportunities.  This survey at your plant is being 
undertaken in conjunction with a research study by the Labor Aerospace Research 
Agenda from MIT funded by the U. S. Department of Labor.  Your responses are an 
important contribution to this effort. 
 
Your participation in the survey is voluntary.  All responses will be kept confidential.  
Only aggregate results will be reported. You indicate your voluntary agreement to 
participate by completing and returning this questionnaire.  
 
Filling out the complete survey should take approximately 10 minutes.  The survey 
includes attitude questions on workplace issues and work practices.  A summary of the 
research results will be available at the end of the study in hard copy on request at 
following address (DoL Boeing Survey at Building E40-211, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 1 Amherst Street, Cambridge, MA 02139, or electronically at our web site 
(http://web.mit.edu/ctpid/lara/). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part A: Individual profile  
 
A1.  a.  How long have you worked in the aerospace industry?  _______________   Years  
 b. How long have you worked for this company?              _______________   Years 
   
A2. What is your title or job 
classification?______________________________________________ 
 
A3. What is the primary program that you work on? ______________________________________ 
 
A4. What is the name of your team or department? _______________________________________ 
 
A5.  How long have you worked on this team? __________________________________________ 
 
 
Part B: Instability 
 
B1. In the past three years, how often has your work been impacted by each of the following:  
 Never   Sometimes Frequently 
a. My work has been affected by changes in budget allocations for 
government contracts 
    0            1            2 
b. My work has been affected by changes in internal company budgets     0            1            2 
c. My work has been affected by changes in product demand      0            1            2 
d. My work has been affected by changes in customer requirements, 
technical design or materials 
    0            1            2 
e. My work has been affected by changes in equipment or other 
technology 
    0            1            2 
f.  My work has been affected by changes in supplier performance     0            1            2 
g.  My work has been affected by subcontracting of work previously 
done “in house” 
    0            1            2 
h.  My work has been affected by the “in-sourcing” of work (bringing it 
back to the facility) that had previously been out sourced 
    0            1            2 
m.  My work has been affected by changes in leadership vision     0            1            2 
n.  My work has been affected by changes in the job classification 
system 
    0            1            2 
o.  Other(Please specify): __________________________________     0            1            2 
 
 
B2. Which item in B1 above has most affected your work?  (fill in appropriate letter) _______  
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Part C: Context 
 
C.1 Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements with 
respect to your primary work area. 
 Strongly      Neither Agree    Strongly 
Disagree        nor Disagree      Agree 
Don’t 
Know 
a. In the current labor market my skills make it easy to find a job     1         2         3         4         5 ? 
b. There is high demand for the product I make     1         2         3         4         5 ? 
c. I feel more and more uncertain about my future in this 
industry 
    1         2         3         4         5 ? 
d. I would highly recommend that my children work in this 
industry 
    1         2         3         4         5 ? 
 
Part D:  Learning Environment 
D.1  Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 Strongly        Neither Agree          Strongly  
Disagree         nor Disagree             Agree 
a. My employer provides opportunities to learn new skills    1            2            3            4            5          
b. My employer encourages me to try different approaches to 
solve problems 
   1            2            3            4            5          
c. My employer assigns tasks I can perform without error    1            2            3            4            5          
d. I am rewarded for using on my job, what I have learned in 
training 
   1            2            3            4            5          
e. My supervisors and coworkers help reschedule work so that I 
can attend training 
   1            2            3            4            5          
f. In my work area, supervisors are open to new ideas and 
suggestions 
   1            2            3            4            5          
g. In my work area, employees are open to new ideas and 
suggestions 
   1            2            3            4            5          
h. I can openly express my views (e.g., agreement or 
disagreement) to management 
   1            2            3            4            5          
i. I understand how my job relates to others in the organization    1            2            3            4            5          
j. I have the skills I need to perform my job quite effectively    1            2            3            4            5          
k. I am encouraged to develop the skills needed for advancement    1            2            3            4            5          
l. My employer always asks me about my training needs    1            2            3            4            5          
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Strongly        Neither Agree          Strongly  
Disagree         nor Disagree             Agree 
n. I am confident in my ability to adapt to change on my job    1            2            3            4            5          
o. Employees here are responsible for demonstrating on the job 
 what they learned in training 
   1            2            3            4            5          
p. I have learned more tasks and increased my flexibility    1            2            3            4            5          
q. The information necessary for my work is always available    1            2            3            4            5          
r. I have been assigned a mentor to help my learning in the 
 organization 
   1            2            3            4            5          
s. I have served in a formal apprenticeship program to learn my 
 craft 
   1            2            3            4            5          
t. I am paid on a “pay for knowledge” basis where I get 
 additional increments of pay for learning new skills 
   1            2            3            4            5          
u. Practically everything I know about how to do my job I have 
 learned through “on-the-job” training (OJT) 
   1            2            3            4            5          
v. My skill level has increased as a result of new work practices    1            2            3            4            5          
w. Increasing my skill level will help me maintain employment    1            2            3            4            5          
x. Learning new work practices will increase my employability     1            2            3            4            5          
 
 
Part E: Outcomes 
 
E1. Since the new labor grade/job family took effect, what has been the overall trend for the following 
outcomes: 
 
 Significant             No               Significant  Decrease             Change          Increase     
Don’t 
Know 
a. Use of overtime     1           2           3           4           5  ? 
b. Outsourcing certain operations    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
c. Loss of people with critical skills    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
d. Apprentice training    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
e. Number of tasks included in my job    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
f.  My employment options    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
g. Other (please specify) _____________________     1           2           3           4           5  ? 
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Part F: Indicators 
 
F1. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly        Neither Agree          Strongly  
Disagree         nor Disagree             Agree 
a.  I really wish that I could come in, do my work and go home   
without all the “consulting.” 
   1            2            3            4            5          
b.  Today I have the authority to make work-related decisions that 
my supervisor used to make.  
   1            2            3            4            5          
c.   Increasing my flexibility at work makes me more effective.    1            2            3            4            5          
d.  My job makes good use of my skills and abilities.    1            2            3            4            5          
e.  Working with other people is always troublesome.    1            2            3            4            5          
f.  More and more the quality of work I do depends on other 
people’s work. 
   1            2            3            4            5          
g.  I trust my co-workers to do a good job.    1            2            3            4            5          
h. Work on my team is more difficult since the change in labor 
grades/job families.    1            2            3            4            5          
i.    1            2            3            4            5          
j.  Overall I am very satisfied with the labor grade/job family plan.    1            2            3            4            5          
 
 
F2.  Please give your overall impression of the changes in these performance indicators, since the new 
labor grade/job family took effect.  (Circle one number for each row.) 
 
Performance Indicators Significant             No              Significant Decrease             Change            Increase 
Don’t 
Know 
a. Productivity     1           2           3           4           5  ? 
b. Quality of product or service    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
c. Customer service    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
d. Overall worker satisfaction    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
g. Schedule/delivery performance    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
h. Profitability    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
i. Moving decision-making authority to lower organizational  
 levels 
   1           2           3           4           5  ? 
j. Information flow throughout the corporation    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
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k. Employee trust in management    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
l. Employee trust in co-workers    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
m. Employee trust in the union    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
n. Worker responsibility for outcomes    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
o. Employment security    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
p. Overall understanding of company goals    1           2           3           4           5  ? 
q. Communication with co-workers and people on 
 other teams (if relevant) 
   1           2           3           4           5  ? 
 
Part G: Training, Demographics and Other Factors: 
 
G1.  How many hours of formal training have you received in the last year? (Please check one) 
  Less than 8 hours        8-20 hours        21-40 hours       41-80 hours        More than 80 hours 
G2.  What percentage of your training was voluntary? 
 None  Under 25%  26-50%  51-75%  76-100% 
G3.  What percentage of your training was on your own time?  
 None  Under 25%  26-50%  51-75%  76-100% 
G4.  What percentage of your training was on company time? 
 None  Under 25%  26-50%  51-75%  76-100% 
G5.  In the hours of formal training above, how many of the hours were related to technical skills? 
     Less than 4 hours           5-10 hours           more than 10 hours 
G6.  In the hours of formal training above, how many of the hours were related to people or process 
skills? 
     Less than 4 hours           5-10 hours           more than 10 hours`  
G7.  Your gender:             Male            Female   
G8.  Your age range:       Under 25        26-35       36-45        46-55       56-65       Over 65 
G9.  Your education level: (select one)              High school         Some college          Two-year degree 
                                                              Bachelor’s degree        Master’s degree         Doctorate 
                                                           Other _______________________________ 
Additional Comments: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. 
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Glossary of Acronyms 
A&P Certification Airframe and Power Plant Mechanic Certification 
ACLC Advanced Craftsmanship Learning Center 
AMAA Assembly Mechanic – All Around 
CFR Code of Federal Regulation 
CI Collateral inspection certification 
DOL Department of Labor 
FOD Foreign object debris 
HPWO High Performance Work Organization 
IAM International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers 
IPT Integrated Product Teams 
JSF Joint Strike Fighter 
LAI Lean Aircraft Initiative 
LARA Labor Aerospace Research Agenda 
MAP Mechanic-Aircraft Production 
MDC McDonnell Douglas Corporation 
MER Mechanic Electrical and Radio 
O*NET Occupational Information Network 
OV Operator verification and collateral inspection 
PoU Point-of-use logistics 
RF Realization Factor 
SAP SubAssembler-Precision 
SHEA Safety, Health, and the environment 
SMAR Sheet Metal Assembler and Riveter 
 
